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THE QUANTUM OF SUSPICION NEEDED FOR AN EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES SEARCH
Kit Kinports*
ABSTRACT
For decades, the United States Supreme Court opinions articulating the 
standard of exigency necessary to trigger the exigent circumstances exception to the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement have been maddeningly opaque and 
confusing. Some cases require probable cause, others call for reasonable suspicion, 
and still others use undefined and unhelpful terms such as “reasonable to believe” 
in describing how exigent the situation must be to permit the police to proceed 
without a warrant. Not surprisingly, the conflicting signals coming from the 
Supreme Court have led to disagreement in the lower courts.
To resolve this conflict and provide guidance to law enforcement officials and 
lower court judges, this Article proposes a three-step solution. First, the Court 
should reaffirm that probable cause to enter is a prerequisite for any exigent 
circumstances search: probable cause to believe, for example, that a suspect or piece 
of evidence is presently located on the premises. Second, the Court should clarify 
that any full search also requires probable cause of exigency: an independent 
finding of probable cause to believe that taking the time to obtain a warrant would 
result in some untoward consequence. This Article thus rejects the views expressed 
by some scholars that the Court already does—or should—allow at least some 
exigent circumstances searches on a standard lower than probable cause. Third, 
the Court should retreat from its opinions holding that a police officer’s subjective 
motivations are irrelevant in the subset of exigent circumstances cases where the 
entry is purportedly intended to provide emergency aid or further some other non-
law-enforcement interest. Rather, the Court should recognize that these searches 
are, in essence, administrative inspections and therefore should demand proof that 
the primary purpose of the entry was actually to provide assistance, rather than to 
investigate a crime or conduct a pretextual search for evidence.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court opinions describing the amount of exi-
gency needed to support a warrantless search under the exigent 
circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant re-
quirement have long varied. Some decisions speak in terms of 
probable cause, others require reasonable suspicion, and many 
others use amorphous, undefined phrases such as “reasonable to 
believe.” These unexplained fluctuations in the Court’s standard of 
exigency have generated uncertainty and conflicts among the low-
er courts. 
To resolve these discrepancies, this Article recommends a three-
part approach. First, law enforcement officials should have proba-
ble cause to enter the premises in order to make any exigent cir-
cumstances search—probable cause to believe, for example, that a 
wanted suspect or evidence of a crime can be found on the proper-
ty. Second, even when police have probable cause to search, a war-
rantless full search under the exigent circumstances exception 
should also require an additional and distinct finding of probable 
cause: probable cause to believe that some exigency justifies the 
failure to obtain a warrant. The lesser standard of reasonable sus-
picion of exigency should be sufficient to justify only intrusions 
that are less invasive than a full search, such as a protective sweep, a 
no-knock entry, or an impoundment of the premises while a war-
rant is obtained. Finally, to maintain consistency with the Fourth 
Amendment standards governing administrative searches, entries 
to offer emergency aid or to serve some other non-law-
enforcement interest should require proof that the police were 
primarily motivated by the need to provide that assistance and were 
not conducting a pretextual search for evidence.1
In sketching out this proposal, the Article proceeds in three 
parts. Part I discusses the Supreme Court’s case law in this area, set-
ting out the conflict in the Court’s descriptions of the amount of 
exigency required to justify an exigent circumstances search and 
highlighting the disagreement that conflict has created in the low-
1. Although this summary is written in terms of Fourth Amendment “searches,” the 
proposal also applies to intrusions that qualify as Fourth Amendment “seizures.” See infra
notes 15–16 & 140 and accompanying text.
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er courts. Rejecting the argument that terms like “reasonable to be-
lieve” necessarily connote a standard lower than probable cause, 
Part II traces the history of the Court’s use of such language in its 
Fourth Amendment rulings and the varying definitions the Court 
has given that term. Part III then defends the Article’s proposed 
approach, separately analyzing each of its three elements.
I. THE CONFLICT CREATED BY THE SUPREME COURT
As a general rule, compliance with the Fourth Amendment’s 
ban on “unreasonable searches and seizures”2 dictates that any 
search or seizure must be supported by both probable cause and a 
warrant, “subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.”3 The Supreme Court has long recognized 
exigent circumstances as one of the principal exceptions to the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.4
The notion of exigency encompasses a number of different con-
cerns. Some are traditional law enforcement interests: the need to 
apprehend a fleeing suspect,5 to prevent the destruction of evi-
dence,6 or to protect the public or officers from a dangerous per-
son or item.7 Others are “emergency assistance” or “community 
caretaking” interests: the need to help an injured person8 or to 
safeguard someone’s property.9 Although, as discussed below, low-
er court judges and scholars disagree about the relationship be-
tween these different varieties of exigency,10 the Supreme Court 
has treated them all as subcategories of a single exigent circum-
stances exception to the warrant requirement.11
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 357 (1967)). On occasion, the Court has departed from this warrant presumption 
model and has instead assessed the constitutionality of a search by using a balancing test to 
determine whether the search was reasonable. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 448 
(2013); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 
112, 118–19 (2001). See generally 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 10.01[C] (6th ed. 2013).
4. See, e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970).
5. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967).
6. See, e.g., Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 332 (2001) (discussed infra notes 25–26 
and accompanying text).
7. See, e.g., Hayden, 387 U.S. at 298–99.
8. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (discussed infra notes 23, 
72–85 & 125–37 and accompanying text).
9. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (discussed infra notes 157–
61 and accompanying text).
10. See infra notes 111–14 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011); see also infra note 114 and ac-
companying text.
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The Court has been less consistent, however, in articulating the 
quantum of proof of exigency necessary to justify a warrantless 
search or seizure in exigent circumstances. Some Supreme Court
decisions mandate that law enforcement officials have probable 
cause to believe some adverse consequence will occur if they must
satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Others re-
quire reasonable suspicion. And frequently, the Court’s opinions 
use vague, undefined terms such as “reason to believe” or “reason-
able belief.”
In Minnesota v. Olson, for example, the Supreme Court endorsed 
a probable cause requirement in affirming the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s conclusion that exigent circumstances did not excuse the 
officers’ failure to obtain a warrant before entering a home to con-
duct an arrest.12 The Court noted that the state supreme court had 
applied “the proper legal standard” in requiring “at least probable 
cause to believe that one or more . . . of the . . . factors justifying 
the [warrantless] entry were present” (unless the police were in hot 
pursuit of a fleeing suspect).13 That language suggests that the exi-
gent circumstances exception requires probable cause to believe a 
warrantless entry is necessary to prevent the “imminent destruction 
of evidence, . . . a suspect’s escape, or the risk of danger to the po-
lice or other persons.”14
Likewise, in Tennessee v. Garner, the Court held that the use of 
deadly force to apprehend a fleeing felon—a “seizure” in Fourth 
Amendment terms15—is permissible only if the police have “proba-
ble cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of 
death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.”16 Similar 
language requiring probable cause has appeared in a number of 
the Justices’ separate opinions discussing the exigent circumstanc-
es exception.17
12. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990).
13. See id. (likewise observing that the court below “applied essentially the correct 
standard in determining whether exigent circumstances existed”).
14. Id. (quoting State v. Olson, 436 N.W.2d 92, 97 (Minn. 1989), aff’d, 495 U.S. 91 
(1990)).
15. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
16. Id. at 3; see also Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per curiam) (apply-
ing the same standard).
17. See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 177 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (observ-
ing that the exigent circumstances exception applies if police have “probable cause to be-
lieve that failure to act would result in” the destruction of evidence); Illinois v. McArthur, 
531 U.S. 326, 337 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (pointing out that probable cause to be-
lieve evidence will be destroyed “exemplifies the kind of present risk that undergirds the 
accepted exigent circumstances exception”); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 759 (1984) 
(White, J., dissenting) (noting that a warrantless entry to arrest is permissible based on 
“probable cause to believe that the delay involved in procuring an arrest warrant will gravely 
endanger the officer or other persons or will result in the suspect’s escape”); cf. Georgia v. 
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 141 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of 
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In other cases, the Supreme Court has required only reasonable 
suspicion that some untoward consequence will result if police are 
forced to adhere to the usual Fourth Amendment requirements.
Reasonable suspicion is, of course, the quantum of evidence neces-
sary to conduct a Terry stop-and-frisk.18 In Maryland v. Buie, for ex-
ample, the Court rejected probable cause as “unnecessarily strict”
and instead adopted Terry’s reasonable suspicion requirement as 
the standard for allowing a protective sweep of a home beyond the 
areas “immediately adjoining the place of arrest.”19 Such sweeps are 
permissible, the Court held, if the police have “a reasonable, artic-
ulable suspicion that the house is harboring a person posing a 
danger to those on the arrest scene.”20
Likewise, the Court’s opinion in Richards v. Wisconsin concluded 
that a reasonable suspicion standard—“as opposed to a probable 
cause requirement—strikes the appropriate balance” between “le-
gitimate law enforcement concerns” and “individual privacy inter-
ests” in determining when police may enter without complying
with the Fourth Amendment’s knock-and-announce requirement.21
Thus, Richards allows police to make a no-knock entry to execute a 
warrant based on “reasonable suspicion that knocking and an-
nouncing their presence . . . would be dangerous or futile, or that 
it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for ex-
ample, allowing the destruction of evidence.”22
Finally, the Court at times has required a reasonable belief, or 
reason to believe, that an exigency exists in order to justify dispens-
ing with the usual Fourth Amendment requirements. Language 
along these lines has appeared in several Supreme Court opinions 
authorizing a warrantless “emergency assistance” or “community 
caretaking” entry. In Brigham City v. Stuart, for example, the Court 
held that law enforcement officials may enter a home without a 
warrant “when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believ-
ing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened 
“creat[ing] a new exception to the warrant requirement to justify warrantless entry short of 
exigency” by allowing the police to enter despite a co-occupant’s refusal to consent if they 
have “‘good reason’” to believe that “‘violence (or threat of violence) has occurred or is 
about to (or soon will) occur’” (quoting id. at 118 (majority opinion))); Vale v. Louisiana, 
399 U.S. 30, 40 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (concluding that the exigent circumstances 
exception should have allowed a warrantless entry where police had “probable cause to be-
lieve that a felony had been committed and that immediate action was necessary” (emphasis 
added)).
18. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25–27 (1968) (rejecting a probable cause require-
ment).
19. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337, 334 (1990).
20. Id. at 336.
21. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997).
22. Id.
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with such injury.”23 In Cady v. Dombrowski, the Court likewise con-
cluded that “concern for the safety of the general public” allowed 
the warrantless “community caretaking” search of an automobile 
that was “reasonably believed to contain a gun.”24
The Court has also suggested that reasonable belief is the requi-
site quantum of suspicion in some cases involving the threatened 
destruction of evidence. In Illinois v. McArthur, for example, the 
Court allowed law enforcement officials to prevent a suspect from 
entering his residence unaccompanied by the police while they ob-
tained a search warrant for the home.25 One of the Court’s justifi-
cations for permitting the officers to secure the premises in McAr-
thur was that “[t]hey reasonably believed that the home’s resident, 
if left free of any restraint, would destroy th[e] evidence.”26
Similarly, in Schmerber v. California, the Court approved of a war-
rantless blood draw in a DUI case where the officer “might reason-
ably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in 
which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant . . . threatened ‘the 
destruction of evidence.’”27 When the same issue recently returned 
to the Court in Missouri v. McNeely, the majority rejected the notion 
that the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream creates a 
per se exigency in DUI cases, but quoted with approval Schmerber’s
“might reasonably have believed” language.28 The Court concluded
that “our analysis in Schmerber fits comfortably within our case law 
applying the exigent circumstances exception.”29 Three of the Jus-
tices in the minority in McNeely, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part, likewise took the position that “[t]he reasonable belief that 
critical evidence is being destroyed gives rise to a compelling need 
for [warrantless] blood draws.”30
23. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006).
24. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 447–48 (1973); see also Michigan v. Fisher, 
558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009) (per curiam) (noting that the “‘emergency aid exception’ . . . re-
quires only ‘an objectively reasonable basis for believing’ that ‘a person within [the home] is 
in need of immediate aid’” (first quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406; then quoting Mincey 
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978))); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 118 (2006) (ac-
knowledging “the authority of the police to enter a dwelling to protect a resident from do-
mestic violence,” despite a cotenant’s objection, “so long as they have good reason to believe 
such a threat exists”); Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392 (pointing out that “[n]umerous state and fed-
eral cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from 
making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is 
in need of immediate aid”).
25. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 328 (2001).
26. Id.
27. Schmerber v. California, 387 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (quoting Preston v. United 
States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)).
28. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 150 (2013) (quoting Schmerber, 387 U.S. at 770).
29. Id. at 151.
30. Id. at 169 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Kentucky 
v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 n.5 (2011) (denying that Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 
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In none of these opinions did the Court bother to define the 
amorphous phrase “reasonably believed,” and the Justices ap-
peared unconcerned with clarifying how it compares to the more 
familiar constructs of probable cause and reasonable suspicion.
Not surprisingly, therefore, lower court judges and scholars disa-
gree on the meaning of terms such as “reasonable belief” in cases 
involving exigent circumstances.31 Some lower court opinions 
equate the language with probable cause.32 Others believe it is “less 
exacting” than probable cause,33 with some analogizing it to rea-
(1948), was “a case about exigent circumstances” because “the Government did not claim 
that [the] noise [the officers heard in that case] was a noise that would have led a reasona-
ble officer to think that evidence was about to be destroyed”); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 
291, 298 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring) (concluding that the warrantless scraping of the 
suspect’s fingernails was permissible in order to “assure the preservation of the evidence”
because “there was good reason to believe that Murphy might attempt to alter the status quo 
unless he were prevented from doing so”).
For lower court opinions adopting the “reasonable belief” standard in destruction of 
evidence cases, see, for example, United States v. Almonte-Báez, 857 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 
2017); United States v. Ramirez, 676 F.3d 755, 759–60 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Menchaca-Castruita, 587 F.3d 283, 295 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Rivera, 248 F.3d 677, 
680 (7th Cir. 2001); Commonwealth v. Ramos, 25 N.E.3d 849, 855 (Mass. 2015); State v. 
Walker, 62 A.3d 897, 904 (N.J. 2013); State v. Duran, 156 P.3d 795, 797 (Utah 2007); State v. 
Hughes, 607 N.W.2d 621, 628 (Wis. 2000).
31. For discussion of the various approaches lower courts have taken in exigent circum-
stances cases, see Barbara C. Salken, Balancing Exigency and Privacy in Warrantless Searches to 
Prevent Destruction of Evidence: The Need for a Rule, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 283, 300–20 (1988); Me-
gan Pauline Marinos, Comment, Breaking and Entering or Community Caretaking? A Solution to 
the Overbroad Expansion of the Inventory Search, 22 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 249, 263–73 (2012); 
Geoffrey C. Sonntag, Note, Probable Cause, Reasonable Suspicion, or Mere Speculation?: Holding 
Police to a Higher Standard in Destruction of Evidence Exigency Cases, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 629, 640–
46 (2003); Claire Frances Stamm, Comment, Defining the Destruction of Evidence Exigency Excep-
tion: Why Courts Should Adopt a Strict Probable Cause Standard in the Wake of Kentucky v. King, 82 
MISS. L.J. 1417, 1423–26 (2013).
32. See, e.g., Almonte-Báez, 857 F.3d at 32 (discussing exigent circumstances); Sutterfield 
v. City of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 564 (7th Cir. 2014) (addressing emergency aid); United 
States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1338 (11th Cir. 2002) (same); Koch v. Town of Brattle-
boro, 287 F.3d 162, 169 (2d Cir. 2002) (same); Flores v. State, 994 P.2d 782, 784 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1999) (discussing exigency and emergency aid); 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 6.6(a), at 600 (5th ed. 2012) (describing 
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), discussed supra text accompanying note 23); id.
§ 7.4(c), at 869 (describing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), discussed supra text ac-
companying note 24); cf. State v. Watts, 801 N.W.2d 845, 851 (Iowa 2011) (observing that 
the “probability” that evidence will be lost justifies a warrantless exigent circumstances 
search); State v. Deluca, 775 A.2d 1284, 1287 (N.J. 2001) (defining exigent circumstances in 
terms of the “probability” of exigency); State v. Boggess, 340 N.W.2d 516, 523 (Wis. 1983) 
(relying on the Supreme Court’s definition of “traditional probable cause” in Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213 (1984), as “relevant” in applying a reasonable belief standard in an emergency 
aid case). For courts refusing to equate “reasonable belief” with probable cause, without 
providing any affirmative definition of the term, see Hill v. Walsh, 884 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 
2018) (discussing emergency aid); State v. Allison, 86 P.3d 421, 427 (Colo. 2004) (same).
33. United States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing emergen-
cy aid and community caretaking); see also, e.g., State v. Carlson, 548 N.W.2d 138, 142 (Iowa 
1996) (addressing emergency aid); Duquette v. Godbout, 471 A.2d 1359, 1362 (R.I. 1984) 
(same).
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sonable suspicion.34 And still others view “reasonable belief” as a 
separate standard distinct from both probable cause and reasona-
ble suspicion.35 Some in this third group take the position that rea-
sonable belief requires a showing somewhere between probable 
cause and reasonable suspicion,36 whereas others believe it is a 
standard even lower than reasonable suspicion.37 Most lower court
opinions, following the Supreme Court’s lead, do not attempt to 
define the term or to situate it on the probable cause/reasonable
suspicion spectrum.38
As discussed in the following Part, terms like “reason to believe” 
have also appeared in Supreme Court opinions addressing other 
Fourth Amendment issues. Given the history of the Court’s use of 
such language, it is wrong to assume that it necessarily requires a 
standard less rigorous than probable cause in exigent circumstanc-
es cases.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Beaudoin, 362 F.3d 60, 66–67 (1st Cir. 2004) (addressing 
exigent circumstances), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Champagne v. United States, 543 
U.S. 1102 (2005); Craig M. Bradley, A Sensible Emergency Doctrine, 42 TRIAL, Aug. 2006, at 60, 
62 [hereinafter Bradley, Sensible Emergency Doctrine] (discussing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 
U.S. 398 (2006) (described supra text accompanying note 23)); Craig M. Bradley, The Rea-
sonable Policeman: Police Intent in Criminal Procedure, 76 MISS. L.J. 339, 370–71 (2006) [herein-
after Bradley, Reasonable Policeman] (addressing the reasonable suspicion standards imposed 
by Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) (described supra text accompanying notes 21–
22), and Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (described supra text accompanying notes 
19–20)); Sonntag, supra note 31, at 637–38 (referring to Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 
(2001) (described supra text accompanying notes 25–26)). For an opinion using language 
reminiscent of Terry’s “specific and articulable facts” standard in defining a reasonable be-
lief, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968), see People v. Slaughter, 803 N.W.2d 171, 182 
(Mich. 2011) (discussing community caretaking).
35. See, e.g., State v. Ryon, 108 P.3d 1032, 1040–43 (N.M. 2005) (distinguishing the “rea-
sonable belief” necessary for a community caretaking search from both probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion).
36. See, e.g., Stamm, supra note 31, at 1435 (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 
(2006) (described supra text accompanying note 23), and Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 
(2001) (described supra text accompanying notes 25–26)).
37. See, e.g., State v. Dunn, 964 N.E.2d 1037, 1040 (Ohio 2012) (discussing community 
caretaking and emergency aid); Isaac J. Colunga, When the Supreme Court Departs from Its Tra-
ditional Function, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 47, 65 n.113 (2010) (comparing the “reasonableness de-
termination” adopted in Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), to an “arbitrary and ca-
pricious standard,” requiring “simply . . . the ability to justify [a] decision with the facts in 
the record”).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 676 F.3d 755, 759–60 (8th Cir. 2012) (discussing 
destruction of evidence); Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 176–77 (3d Cir. 2010) (ad-
dressing community caretaking); United States v. Menchaca-Castruita, 587 F.3d 283, 295 
(5th Cir. 2009) (discussing exigent circumstances); United States v. Rivera, 248 F.3d 677, 
680–81 (7th Cir. 2001) (addressing destruction of evidence); State v. Neighbors, 328 P.3d 
1081, 1091 (Kan. 2014) (discussing emergency aid); Commonwealth v. Ramos, 25 N.E.3d 
849, 855 (Mass. 2015) (addressing destruction of evidence); State v. Walker, 62 A.3d 897, 
904 (N.J. 2013) (same); State v. Duran, 156 P.3d 795, 797 (Utah 2007) (same); State v. 
Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d 592, 602–03 (Wis. 2010) (addressing community caretaking); State v. 
Hughes, 607 N.W.2d 621, 628 (Wis. 2000) (discussing destruction of evidence).
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II. THE MEANING OF “REASON TO BELIEVE”
Exigency has historically been considered a justification for dis-
pensing with a warrant, but not an exception to probable cause.39
When the Court has used terms like “reasonable belief” in its exi-
gent circumstances opinions without specifically equating that lan-
guage with reasonable suspicion, the Justices have given no indica-
tion that they intended to lower the required quantum of proof to 
something less than probable cause. 
In fact, although the city argued in Brigham City v. Stuart that an 
entry to provide emergency aid should be justifiable on a showing 
of reasonable suspicion,40 the Solicitor General’s brief in that case 
equated the term “reasonable to believe” with probable cause, ac-
knowledging that probable cause was the appropriate standard. 
“[A]n entry to render aid is not based on a ‘less demanding’ show-
ing than a warrant, just a different showing,” the Solicitor General 
pointed out, noting that “an emergency aid entry . . . must always 
rest on known facts that make it objectively reasonable for an of-
ficer to believe that an immediate need for assistance exists.”41 The 
Court did not resolve that issue, preferring to leave “reasonable ba-
sis for believing” undefined.42 Still, the discussion in the briefs indi-
cates that the Justices were aware that the term is susceptible to dif-
ferent interpretations and does not necessarily connote a standard 
lower than probable cause. 
The Court’s use of ambiguous terms like “reasonable belief” in 
Fourth Amendment cases is not confined to its exigent circum-
stances opinions. Although the Court’s rulings have ascribed dif-
ferent meanings to “reasonable belief,” they do not provide any 
support for the assumption that the exigent circumstances deci-
sions that have used this language without defining it have silently 
departed from the probable cause requirement. 
Admittedly, some of the references to “reasonable belief” in the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment case law do imply a standard lower 
39. See, e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); see also infra note 69 and accom-
panying text.
40. See Brief for Petitioner at 18–20, Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (No. 
05-502) (discussing the concept of a reasonable basis to believe, and arguing that “police 
intervention to render emergency aid is justified upon a showing of individualized suspicion, 
akin to reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause”).
41. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18, Brigham 
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (No. 05-502); see also id. at 18 n.18 (“Indeed, one way to 
conceptualize the emergency aid situation is that the basic requirement that the police have 
an objectively reasonable belief—i.e., probable cause—does not change, but the object of 
the probable cause does change. Rather than requiring an objectively reasonable basis for 
an officer to believe a crime has been or is about to occur, the officer needs an objectively 
reasonable basis to believe that an emergency need for assistance exists.”).
42. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 400.
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than probable cause. In Payton v. New York, for example, in the 
course of holding that the police must obtain a warrant to make an 
in-home arrest, the Court observed that an arrest warrant allows 
entry into the home “when there is reason to believe the suspect is 
within.”43 Although some Justices have interpreted this language as 
equivalent to a probable cause requirement,44 the Payton majority 
likely intended to endorse some lesser standard of proof because it 
expressly rejected the need for “a search warrant based on proba-
ble cause to believe the suspect is at home.”45 In fact, the lower 
courts have most often read the Payton standard as a “unique for-
mulation” somewhat lower than probable cause.46
Likewise, in Arizona v. Gant, the Court extended the warrant ex-
ception for searches incident to the arrest of a vehicle’s occupants 
to situations where “it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to 
the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’”47 The Court did 
not further clarify this standard or discuss its relationship to prob-
able cause and reasonable suspicion. Presumably, however, the Jus-
tices did not intend to require probable cause, which would inde-
pendently entitle the police to search the vehicle under the 
automobile exception.48 Accordingly, a number of lower courts 
have interpreted Gant’s “reasonable to believe” language to require 
only reasonable suspicion.49
Although there are justifications for inferring that the Court did 
not mean to require probable cause in Payton and Gant, no similar 
reasoning applies in the context of exigent circumstances. As not-
ed above, exigency has not generally been considered an exception 
to the probable cause requirement. And, in contrast to Payton and 
Gant, there is no basis for assuming the Court tacitly intended to 
deviate from that tradition where its exigent circumstances opin-
ions have used terms like “reasonable belief” without specifically 
endorsing a reasonable suspicion standard.
Adding to the uncertainty created by the appearance of phrases 
such as “reasonable belief” and “reason to believe” untethered to 
either probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the Court has on 
other occasions specifically equated these terms both with reason-
43. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980).
44. See id. at 616 n.13 (White, J., dissenting); see also Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 341 
n.3 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. Payton, 445 U.S. at 602.
46. Matthew A. Edwards, Posner’s Pragmatism and Payton Home Arrests, 77 WASH. L. REV.
299, 363 (2002); see also 3 LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 6.1(a), at 354–55 (citing conflicting cas-
es).
47. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 
U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)).
48. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 7.1(d), at 711.
49. See id. at 712 n.202 (citing cases).
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able suspicion and with probable cause.50 In fact, before the Court 
created the stop-and-frisk exception to the warrant requirement in 
Terry v. Ohio, the terms “probable cause,” “reasonable suspicion,”
“reasonable cause,” and “reasonable belief” had roughly the same 
connotation and were used interchangeably.51
Linguistically, phrases such as “reasonable belief” seem more 
closely aligned with reasonable suspicion, and in fact, in Terry itself, 
the Court noted that an officer who has “reason to believe” a sus-
pect is armed and dangerous may conduct a frisk, “regardless of 
whether he has probable cause to arrest.”52 In addition, the Court 
used the phrase “reasonable grounds to believe” in finding that 
reasonable suspicion existed on the facts of Terry.53 Similarly, the 
Court later characterized Terry’s reasonable suspicion standard in 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce as requiring “reasonable grounds to 
believe” a suspect is armed and dangerous.54
By contrast, the phrase “reasonable grounds to believe” is “often 
interpreted as a synonym for ‘probable cause,’”55 and other Su-
preme Court opinions have associated the term with that higher 
standard of proof. In Maryland v. Pringle, for example, the Court 
observed that “[t]he substance of all the definitions of probable 
cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.”56 Similarly, Illinois 
v. Gates, in describing the probable cause determination made in 
50. See generally Kit Kinports, Diminishing Probable Cause and Minimalist Searches, 6 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 649, 649–57 (2009) (tracing the Court’s use of the terms “probable cause,”
“reasonable suspicion,” and “reasonable belief” and the Justices’ reliance on their probable 
cause precedents in analyzing reasonable suspicion and vice versa).
51. See Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois 
v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 479–95 (1984); Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of 
Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951, 979–80 (2003); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *292 (using the term “probable suspicion” to describe the showing needed 
to arrest).
52. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); see also id. (noting that “the issue is whether a 
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safe-
ty or that of others was in danger”); cf. id. at 30 (using the phrase “reasonably to conclude”
in summarizing the reasonable suspicion standard).
53. Id. at 30.
54. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975); see id. at 880 (summariz-
ing Terry’s reasonable suspicion standard with the term “reasonably believed”); see also Ala-
bama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (using the terms “reasonable . . . to believe” and 
“reason to believe” in finding a sufficient showing of reasonable suspicion there); cf. Heien 
v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014) (using the phrase “reasonable to think” in con-
cluding reasonable suspicion existed in that case); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 
(2002) (using the term “reasonable . . . to infer” in determining that the officer had reason-
able suspicion there).
55. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 7.1(d), at 711.
56. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 
338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)).
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Ker v. California, noted that the police had “a reasonable belief . . .
that Ker was illegally in possession of marijuana.”57
The Supreme Court decisions in cases involving exigent circum-
stances are no exception to the general confusion that surrounds 
the Court’s use of terms like “reasonable to believe.” While some of 
the opinions described above in Part I, such as Brigham City v. Stu-
art, used this language without providing any definition or con-
text,58 others included it when the Justices clearly intended to refer 
both to probable cause and reasonable suspicion. In finding that 
the police did not have the probable cause necessary to justify the 
use of deadly force in Tennessee v. Garner, the Court concluded that 
the officer “could not reasonably have believed that Garner—
young, slight, and unarmed—posed any threat.”59 But the Court’s 
opinion in Maryland v. Buie later used similar language to define 
the reasonable suspicion needed to conduct a protective sweep, 
describing the standard as requiring “‘a reasonable belief’ . . . that 
the area swept harbored an individual posing a danger to the of-
ficer or others.”60
Ideally, the Court should be more precise in its choice of lan-
guage. Although it is perhaps understandable that synonyms such 
as “reasonable to believe” or “reasonable to conclude” appear in 
opinions analyzing both probable cause and reasonable suspicion, 
the Court should avoid using those terms without first tying them 
specifically to either probable cause or reasonable suspicion. 
Where the Court has not done so, however, the fluctuations in 
meaning the Justices have given this language do not mandate an 
assumption that the Court tacitly intended to adopt a standard 
lower than probable cause. 
57. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 n.7 (1983) (quoting Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 
23, 36 (1963) (plurality opinion)); see also District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 587, 
588 (2018) (using the terms “reason to believe” and “a reasonable officer could conclude” in 
finding probable cause to arrest existed there); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 305, 
302 (1999) (refusing to require that police have “positive reason to believe” evidence may be 
in the possession of a passenger, in rejecting the contention that the automobile exception 
requires “a showing of individualized probable cause” for each container inspected); United 
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976) (noting that “[t]he cases construing the Fourth 
Amendment . . . reflect the ancient common-law rule” permitting the police to make a war-
rantless arrest based on “reasonable ground for making the arrest”); Ker, 374 U.S. at 37, 40 
n.12 (using the phrases “a reasonable ground for the officers’ belief” and “reason to believe”
in describing probable cause); MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 120.1 (AM.
LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1975) (observing that an arrest is justified based on “rea-
sonable cause to believe” the suspect committed a crime).
58. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006); see supra notes 23–30 and accom-
panying text.
59. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 21 (1985).
60. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 
1032, 1049–50 (1983)); see also id. at 337.
SPRING 2019] The Quantum of Suspicion 627
Moreover, there is no justification for creating a third amor-
phous “reasonable belief” standard of proof in exigent circum-
stances cases, as some lower courts have done, either between 
probable cause and reasonable suspicion or more forgiving than 
reasonable suspicion.61 The first approach is too confusing. Distin-
guishing between the so-called “common-sense” concepts of prob-
able cause and reasonable suspicion is challenging enough.62 The 
Court has associated probable cause with a “substantial chance”63
and reasonable suspicion with “a moderate chance.”64 It has also 
offered the unhelpful observation that reasonable suspicion is “ob-
viously less demanding” than probable cause.65 But otherwise, the 
Court has steadfastly resisted “[a]rticulating” the two standards 
“precisely”66 on the ground that they are “not readily . . . reduced 
to a neat set of legal rules.”67 Adding a third standard of suspicion 
somewhere between probable cause and reasonable suspicion 
would only exacerbate the line-drawing difficulties that already ex-
ist.
And the second approach—creating an even less rigorous stand-
ard than reasonable suspicion—is dangerous. If law enforcement 
officials cannot even supply some “articulable” suspicion, if they 
have only an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’” 
they have no justification for conducting a warrantless exigent cir-
cumstances search or seizure.68
Given the long line of Supreme Court opinions that have in-
cluded terms such as “reason to believe” in defining both probable 
cause and reasonable suspicion, there is no justification for pre-
suming that the Court’s use of similar language in its exigent cir-
cumstances opinions was meant to silently signal a retreat from the 
traditional probable cause requirement. As detailed in the follow-
ing Part, therefore, a full search under the exigent circumstances 
exception should be permissible only if the police have probable 
cause both to enter and to believe an exigency exists. 
61. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
62. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 (defining probable cause); United States v. Cortez, 449 
U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (defining reasonable suspicion).
63. Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 n.13; see also id. at 238 (defining probable cause as “a fair 
probability”).
64. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371 (2009); see also United 
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (noting that reasonable suspicion requires “consider-
ably less” than a preponderance of the evidence).
65. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7; see also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (observing 
that reasonable suspicion is “a less demanding standard” than probable cause in terms of the 
“quantity or content” of information necessary as well as the “quality” or “reliability” of that 
information).
66. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996).
67. Id. at 695–96 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232).
68. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 27 (1968).
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III. THE WAY OUT OF THE CONFLICT
To clarify the ambiguity surrounding the term “reason to be-
lieve” and resolve the conflict generated by the Supreme Court’s 
differing descriptions of the requisite standard of exigency, courts 
should ask law enforcement officials to satisfy three requirements 
before they may rely on the exigent circumstances warrant excep-
tion. First, there is no reason to deviate from the Supreme Court’s 
traditional mandate that police must have probable cause to enter 
the property in every exigent circumstances case. A second layer of 
probable cause—probable cause with regard to the exigency in 
question—should also be necessary for any full search. Reasonable 
suspicion of exigency should suffice only to support a less intrusive 
search: a protective sweep, a no-knock entry, or an impoundment 
of the premises while the police seek a warrant. Third, when police 
purportedly conduct a search or seizure in the interest of some 
non-law-enforcement concern—to render emergency aid or safe-
guard someone’s property—their primary motivation must be to 
serve that non-law-enforcement interest and not to investigate a 
crime. Each of these three requirements is discussed separately be-
low.
A. Probable Cause to Enter
The Court has long made clear that exigent circumstances are 
an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement but 
not the probable cause requirement. As the Court explained in 
Kirk v. Louisiana, “police officers need either a warrant or probable 
cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful entry 
into a home.”69 Therefore, the exigent circumstances exception 
does not justify a warrantless intrusion unless the police have prob-
able cause to enter the property, that is, probable cause to believe 
that a certain individual or piece of property can be found on the 
premises. 
The Court has not relaxed this probable cause requirement even 
in exigent circumstances cases involving less invasive intrusions. In 
its two opinions allowing the police to secure the premises while 
they sought a search warrant, for example, the Court made clear 
that the officers in both cases had probable cause to believe that 
69. Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (per curiam); see also Horton v. Califor-
nia, 496 U.S. 128, 137 n.7 (1990); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976); Cham-
bers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); 1 
DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 3, § 11.01, at 180.
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evidence of a crime could be found on the property.70 Likewise, in 
allowing protective sweeps in Maryland v. Buie, the Court observed 
that the police had an arrest warrant in that case, as well as proba-
ble cause to believe Buie was home.71
Nevertheless, some view the Court’s decision in Brigham City v. 
Stuart as silently moving away from this probable cause require-
ment, at least in cases involving emergency aid. In Brigham City, law 
enforcement officials made a warrantless entry into a home to assist 
four adults who were “attempting, with some difficulty, to restrain a 
juvenile” who had hit one of the adults in the face.72 Although, as 
discussed below,73 the focus of the opinion was on the relevance of 
the officers’ subjective reasons for entering, the Court, in uphold-
ing the officers’ actions, explained that they had “an objectively 
reasonable basis for believing both that the injured adult might 
need help and that the violence in the kitchen was just begin-
ning.”74
Reasoning that the Supreme Court “failed to conduct any tradi-
tional probable cause inquiry” in Brigham City, the Ninth Circuit in-
terpreted the Court’s opinion as “assum[ing]” that probable cause 
to enter the home “exists whenever law enforcement officers have 
an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that an emergency is 
unfolding in that place.”75 Some scholars likewise accuse the Court 
of “abandon[ing] the probable cause requirement” in Brigham 
City.76
But this argument conflates the two different concepts of proba-
ble cause at work in exigent circumstances cases: whether the po-
lice have probable cause to enter the premises, and whether they 
70. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001) (listing the presence of probable 
cause as the first of four “circumstances, which . . . consider[ed] in combination,” supported 
the constitutionality of the impoundment); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 
(1984) (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by O’Connor, J.) (permitting “securing a dwelling, 
on the basis of probable cause, to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence while a 
search warrant is being sought”); id. at 824 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that im-
poundment would have been permissible from the outside in that case).
71. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 332 (1990).
72. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 401 (2006).
73. See infra notes 125–37 and accompanying text.
74. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406.
75. United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 2008). For other courts taking 
this view, see United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 718 (10th Cir. 2006), and State v. Meeks, 
262 S.W.3d 710, 726 n.31 (Tenn. 2008).
76. Ricardo J. Bascuas, Fourth Amendment Lessons from the Highway and the Subway: A Prin-
cipled Approach to Suspicionless Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 719, 778 (2007); see also Bruce A. 
Antkowiak, Saving Probable Cause, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 569, 575 (2007) (charging that “a
once-traditional part of the exigent circumstances equation becomes quite conspicuous by 
its absence in the opinion”); cf. Marinos, supra note 31, at 283 (viewing the probable cause 
requirement as an open question after Brigham City, at least where police enter a home in a 
non-emergency, community caretaking context).
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have probable cause to believe an exigency exists. In destruction of 
evidence cases, these two inquiries are clearly distinct. Probable 
cause to believe evidence of a crime can be found in a particular 
location does not necessarily translate into probable cause to be-
lieve the evidence will disappear in the time it would take to obtain 
a warrant. In emergency aid cases, the two inquiries may flow more 
easily from one another. When the police see someone inside a 
burning building, for example, they have probable cause to enter 
as well as probable cause to believe an exigency exists. But the two 
probable cause requirements are not “superfluous,” as the Ninth 
Circuit suggested,77 and Brigham City’s use of the undefined term 
“reasonable basis for believing” in defining the quantum of suspi-
cion of exigency necessary in an emergency aid case does not sup-
port relaxing the traditional requirement that all exigent circum-
stances searches require probable cause to enter.78
Moreover, the most likely explanation for the Court’s failure to 
specifically address probable cause in its opinion in Brigham City
was that it was obvious the police did have probable cause to enter 
there. The officers initially went to the house in response to a noise 
complaint, and, when they arrived, they could hear “shouting from 
inside,” corroborating the call they had received.79 Walking up the
driveway “to investigate,” they saw “two juveniles drinking beer in 
the backyard,” giving rise to probable cause to believe the crime of 
underage drinking was in progress.80 At that point, the police went 
into the backyard and were able to see the “altercation taking place 
in the kitchen.”81 The officers’ personal observation of the scuffle 
“through a screen door and windows” clearly gave them probable 
cause to enter.82
77. Snipe, 515 F.3d at 952.
78. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 400.
79. Id. at 401.
80. Id.; cf. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9 n.4 (2013) (holding that police do not con-
duct a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes when they “approach the home in order to 
speak with the occupant, because all are invited to do that,” but their actions do constitute a 
search if they enter “in order to do nothing but conduct a search” (emphasis omitted)); 
Brigham City v. Stuart, 122 P.3d 506, 509 (Utah 2005) (noting that the trial court found as a 
matter of fact that “the officers, from their observations from the front of the residence, de-
termined that it was obvious that knocking on the front door would have done no good,”
and therefore “[i]t was appropriate that they proceed down the driveway alongside the 
house to further investigate” (quoting the trial court order)), rev’d, 547 U.S. 398 (2006).
81. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 400.
82. Id.; see 2 LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 3.5(a), at 331–32 (observing that courts assessing 
probable cause “generally presume[]” police officers “to be reliable”). But cf. Bascuas, supra
note 76, at 779 (asserting, without citation or explanation, that “the police may have learned
of the brawl only by trespassing” because they “saw the fight only after entering into the 
backyard and peering into a window”).
SPRING 2019] The Quantum of Suspicion 631
In fact, the Utah Supreme Court pointed out that the existence 
of probable cause was “unchallenged”83 and therefore “not at issue” 
in Brigham City.84 As a result, it was not surprising that the Supreme 
Court did not devote substantial attention to the question of prob-
able cause. But the issue did not go unmentioned. In the Supreme 
Court’s single reference to probable cause, the Justices seemingly 
endorsed the state supreme court’s conclusion that probable cause 
to enter is a prerequisite for the exigent circumstances exception 
to the warrant requirement: “This exception applies, the [state supreme] 
court explained, where police have probable cause and where ‘a rea-
sonable person [would] believe that the entry was necessary to pre-
vent physical harm to the officers or other persons.’”85
Accordingly, the view that Brigham City silently signaled the 
Court’s intent to depart from tradition and allow exigent circum-
stances searches unsupported by probable cause to enter is not a 
plausible reading of the opinion. As a result, all exigent circum-
stances searches—no matter how great or small the intrusion in-
volved—should require probable cause to believe a particular per-
son or property can be found on the premises.
B. Probable Cause of Exigency
The entry and search of premises under the exigent circum-
stances exception should require probable cause not only to enter, 
but also to believe that exigent circumstances exist—that is, proba-
ble cause that “‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of 
law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objec-
tively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”86 Before they 
conduct a full search, therefore, the police should have probable 
cause to believe that a warrantless entry is necessary to prevent the 
83. Brigham City, 122 P.3d at 509–10 (listing the existence of “‘probable cause . . . to 
enter into the backyard’” as one of the trial judge’s “findings of fact,” noting that the appel-
late court “determined that Brigham City had not challenged the trial court’s findings of 
fact,” and limiting “[o]ur review . . . to the correctness of the legal conclusion . . . that no 
exigent circumstances justified the officers’ entry into the home” because “[t]he accuracy of 
the subsidiary facts relied upon by the court of appeals was unchallenged” (quoting the trial 
court order)).
84. Id. at 511 (“Here, the officers’ observation of the consumption of alcohol by under-
age youths and the blow struck by the juvenile in the kitchen of the dwelling were sufficient 
to establish probable cause and thus are not at issue. Brigham City instead challenges the 
court of appeals’s determination that exigent circumstances did not exist.”).
85. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 402 (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Brigham City, 122 P.3d at 514); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Brigham 
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (No. 05-502) (Justice Ginsburg notes that the officers 
“checked to . . . determine that there was probable cause to enter”).
86. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 
335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)).
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imminent destruction of evidence,87 the imminent escape of a sus-
pect, or imminent injury to the officers or some member of the 
public.88
Reasonable suspicion of exigency should justify only a less inva-
sive Fourth Amendment intrusion. Thus, the Court’s rulings allow-
ing police to conduct a protective sweep89 or make a no-knock en-
try90 based on reasonable suspicion are justifiable. A protective 
sweep is not “a full search of the premises,” but instead allows only 
“a cursory inspection” of places where persons posing a danger to 
the police might be found.91 And a no-knock entry allows law en-
forcement officials to enter without announcing their presence 
when they already have a warrant or some other justification for be-
ing on the property.92 Similarly, although the Court has not identi-
fied the precise showing necessary to allow the police to secure the 
premises while they seek a search warrant,93 an impoundment is “a 
significantly less restrictive restraint” than an arrest or search and 
should likewise be permitted based on reasonable suspicion that 
allowing the residents unrestrained access to their home would, for 
example, lead to the destruction of evidence.94 For a full search, 
87. This is not to suggest that such entries are permissible in cases involving minor of-
fenses. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984) (refusing to permit a warrantless 
entry to preserve evidence of “a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprison-
ment is possible”).
88. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (noting that exi-
gent circumstances “include the need to pursue a fleeing suspect, protect individuals who 
are threatened with imminent harm, or prevent the imminent destruction of evidence”); 
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011) (same).
89. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 336 (1990) (described supra notes 19–20 and 
accompanying text).
90. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997) (described supra notes 21–22 
and accompanying text).
91. Buie, 494 U.S. at 335. The Court also emphasized in Buie that the police were al-
ready lawfully in the house: “[p]ossessing an arrest warrant and probable cause to believe 
Buie was in his home, the officers were entitled to enter and to search anywhere in the 
house in which Buie might be found.” Id. at 332–33. Nevertheless, some lower courts have 
extended Buie and allow the police to enter in order to conduct a protective sweep. Compare
United States v. Wilson, 306 F.3d 231, 238 (5th Cir. 2002) (allowing such an entry), with 
United States v. Timmann, 741 F.3d 1170, 1181 (11th Cir. 2013) (taking the contrary posi-
tion). See generally 3 LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 6.4(c), at 504–08.
92. See Richards, 520 U.S. at 393 n.5 (characterizing a no-knock entry as “less intrusive 
than . . . a warrantless search”).
93. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 328 (2001) (using the undefined term “rea-
sonably believed”) (described supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text).
94. McArthur, 531 U.S. at 332; see also id. at 336 (observing that “[t]emporarily keeping a 
person from entering his home” is “a consequence whenever police stop a person on the 
street”); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984) (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by 
O’Connor, J.) (describing an impoundment as “a seizure” that, unlike a search, “affects only 
possessory interests, not privacy interests”); cf. Sonntag, supra note 31, at 635–38 (likewise 
distinguishing protective sweeps, no-knock entries, and impoundments, though assuming 
that the Supreme Court has clearly required only reasonable suspicion in all three cases).
This is not to say that an impoundment should necessarily be permitted when it in-
trudes on the interests of innocent persons, an issue the Supreme Court has not addressed. 
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however, probable cause of exigency “strikes the appropriate bal-
ance” between law enforcement interests and the individual’s pri-
vacy interests.95 As discussed above, the Court’s use of the unde-
fined term “reasonable basis for believing” in cases like Brigham City 
v. Stuart does not require a different result.96
Nevertheless, one of the early pieces of scholarship to address 
the appropriate standard of exigency proposed requiring only rea-
sonable suspicion that evidence would be destroyed in order to 
trigger the exigent circumstances exception.97 Rejecting probable 
cause as “too rigorous,” the author reasoned that mandating that 
“it must be ‘more probable than not’ that an emergency exists” 
creates an unacceptable “risk . . . that the evidence will be lost.”98
But the Court has never defined probable cause literally, that is, as 
requiring a likelihood greater than fifty percent. In fact, the Court 
has repeatedly refused to quantify the concept of probable cause,99
and considers the probable cause standard to be met by a showing 
of only a “fair probability” or “substantial chance of criminal activi-
ty.”100
Several other commentators have advocated imposing different 
standards of proof depending on the nature of the exigency in-
volved. These scholars would require police to have probable cause 
in destruction of evidence cases but only reasonable suspicion in 
emergency aid and/or community caretaking cases.101
See McArthur, 531 U.S. at 328 (noting that the police had probable cause that the individual 
affected by the impoundment “had hidden marijuana in his home”); Segura, 468 U.S. at 813 
(opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by O’Connor, J.) (pointing out that the apartment’s resi-
dents were under arrest, so that “[t]he actual interference with their possessory interests”
was “virtually nonexistent”).
95. Richards, 520 U.S. at 394.
96. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006); see supra notes 23–24 & 39–68 ac-
companying text.
97. See Salken, supra note 31, at 325; cf. Sonntag, supra note 31, at 651 (proposing that 
“probable cause . . . based on articulable facts” be required in destruction of evidence cases).
98. Salken, supra note 31, at 327 n.205.
99. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (observing that probable cause is 
“incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages”); Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (admonishing that “[f]inely tuned standards such as proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no 
place” in assessing probable cause).
100. Gates, 426 U.S. at 238, 244 n.13.
101. See Bradley, Sensible Emergency Doctrine, supra note 34, at 62; Stamm, supra note 31, at 
1447–48; Michael J.Z. Mannheimer, Thoughts on Kentucky v. King, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 17, 
2011, 2:31 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/05/thoughts-on-
kentucky-v-king.html; cf. Matthew Bell, Fourth Amendment Reasonableness: Why Utah Courts 
Should Embrace the Community Caretaking Exception to the Warrant Requirement, 10 BOALT J. CRIM.
L. 3, ¶ 33 (2005) (proposing that an evaluation of probable cause be restricted to criminal 
investigations, and “a reasonableness standard” be applied to community caretaking search-
es); John F. Decker, Emergency Circumstances, Police Responses, and Fourth Amendment Re-
strictions, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 433, 438–40 (1999) (likewise rejecting a probable 
cause standard for community caretaking and emergency aid searches, and instead suggest-
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One justification offered for this distinction is that police actions 
in the latter circumstances do not rise to the level of “searches” and 
“seizures” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.102 But 
police conduct that does not constitute a search or a seizure is not 
governed by the Fourth Amendment at all and therefore should 
not require probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or any particular 
quantum of proof.103
Moreover, characterizing emergency aid intrusions as neither 
searches nor seizures is problematic. Certainly, the Court has made 
clear that police may approach an individual in public and ask a 
few questions without conducting a Fourth Amendment seizure.104
But any situation in which the reasonable person would not “feel 
free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the en-
counter”105 does effect a Fourth Amendment seizure—regardless of 
whether the officer wants to ask “May I search your bag?” or “Are 
you in distress and in need of help?”106
Likewise, once the police have violated a reasonable expectation 
of privacy,107 they have conducted a “search” for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes irrespective of whether they are acting to uncover 
evidence of a crime or to promote some other social good.108 The 
Court has made that clear when addressing the permissibility of 
administrative searches. As the Court pointed out in discussing 
housing code inspections in Camara v. Municipal Court, it would 
“surely [be] anomalous to say that the individual and his private 
property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when 
the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.”109
ing that those searches be justified based on “an objectionably reasonable basis for a belief 
in the immediate need for police assistance”).
102. See Decker, supra note 101, at 439; see also Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism: 
Community Caretaking, Assistance Searches, and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1485, 1495 n.40 (2009) (citing cases taking this position).
103. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (noting that an “encounter 
[which] is consensual” and does not constitute a “seizure” “will not trigger Fourth Amend-
ment scrutiny” and “no reasonable suspicion is required”); Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives 
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 356 (1974) (pointing out that “[l]aw en-
forcement practices are not required by the fourth amendment to be reasonable unless they 
are either ‘searches’ or ‘seizures’”). See generally 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 3, 
§ 6.01[A], at 67–68; 1 LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 2.1, at 562.
104. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001).
105. Id. at 202 (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436).
106. See, e.g., Dimino, supra note 102, at 1497–98.
107. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
108. See, e.g., 3 LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 6.6, at 595 n.1; Dimino, supra note 102, at 1497.
109. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967); see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. 
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616–17 (1989) (concluding that drug testing railroad employees in the 
interest of public safety rose to the level of a Fourth Amendment search); Michigan v. Tyler, 
436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978) (rejecting the position that entries “to ascertain the cause of a fire 
rather than to look for evidence of a crime” do not constitute searches under the Fourth 
Amendment).
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A second justification proffered for allowing emergency aid 
and/or community caretaking searches on a lesser showing of exi-
gency is that destruction of evidence cases differ from situations 
“when lives (and limbs) are at stake.”110 Although a great deal of 
controversy surrounds the relationship among the concepts of exi-
gent circumstances, emergency aid, and community caretaking—
whether they are three111 (or two)112 separate exceptions to the war-
rant requirement or they all fit within the umbrella of the exigent 
circumstances exception113—the Court has wisely chosen not to dif-
ferentiate among them. In Kentucky v. King, for example, the Court 
noted that exigency is “[o]ne well-recognized exception” to the 
warrant requirement and then listed the preservation of evidence, 
hot pursuit, and emergency aid as the “several exigencies” the 
Court has recognized.114
110. Bradley, Sensible Emergency Doctrine, supra note 34, at 62; see also Stamm, supra note 
31, at 1447 (arguing that “no imminent danger to officers or the public” is involved in a de-
struction of evidence case).
111. Those subscribing to this view generally take the position that exigent circumstanc-
es searches are aimed at serving law enforcement goals and that community caretaking 
searches require less exigency than emergency aid searches. See, e.g., Sutterfield v. City of 
Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 559–61 (7th Cir. 2014); State v. Carlson, 548 N.W.2d 138, 141 & 
n.3 (Iowa 1996); State v. Neighbors, 328 P.3d 1081, 1086, 1091 (Kan. 2014); State v. Pinkard, 
785 N.W.2d 592, 600 & n.8, 605 n.13 (Wis. 2010); 3 LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 6.6(a), at 596 
n.7; Bell, supra note 101, ¶¶ 8, 12, 20; Gregory T. Helding, Comment, Stop Hammering Fourth 
Amendment Rights: Reshaping the Community Caretaking Exception with the Physical Intrusion 
Standard, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 123, 136, 152–53 (2013).
In addition, some courts and commentators, relying on references in the Supreme 
Court’s first community caretaking opinion, Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 442 (1973), to 
“[t]he constitutional difference” between searching automobiles and searching “houses and 
similar structures,” refuse to permit community caretaking searches of homes. See, e.g., Sutter-
field, 751 F.3d at 555–57 (citing conflicting cases); Neighbors, 328 P.3d at 1089 (citing cases 
taking this position); Helding, supra, at 162; Marinos, supra note 31, at 293. For the contrary 
position, see, for example, Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d at 597–601; David Fox, Note, The Community 
Caretaking Exception: How the Courts Can Allow the Police to Keep Us Safe Without Opening the 
Floodgates to Abuse, 63 WAYNE L. REV. 407, 421 (2018). Cady v. Dombrowski is also discussed in-
fra notes 157–61 and accompanying text.
112. For the view that emergency aid and community caretaking constitute one category, 
see, for example, United States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 2006); State v. 
Fausel, 993 A.2d 455, 465–66 (Conn. 2010); People v. Slaughter, 803 N.W.2d 171, 177 n.20, 
185–86 (Mich. 2011); State v. Ryon, 108 P.3d 1032, 1042-43, 1043 n.4 (N.M. 2005); 1 
DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 3, § 11.01, at 180; Decker, supra note 101, at 443–44; Fox, 
supra note 111, at 419–21; Mary Elisabeth Naumann, Note, The Community Caretaker Doctrine: 
Yet Another Fourth Amendment Exception, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 325, 329, 331–32 (1999). Cf.
Stamm, supra note 31, at 1431 (separating “public-safety” and “evidence-gathering” exigen-
cies, though not discussing community caretaking).
For the view that emergency aid and exigent circumstances constitute one category, 
see, for example, United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1334–37 (11th Cir. 2002) (equat-
ing emergency aid and exigency, though not discussing community caretaking); Common-
wealth v. Duncan, 7 N.E.3d 469, 472 n.3, 472-73 (Mass. 2014); Dimino, supra note 102, at 
1507–09; Marinos, supra note 31, at 282–83.
113. See, e.g., State v. Meeks, 262 S.W.3d 710, 723 & n.16 (Tenn. 2008).
114. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011); see Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
2206, 2222–23 (2018) (quoting King with approval); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 
403 (2006) (citing precedents authorizing warrantless exigent circumstances searches and 
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At some level, all police work is designed to promote the public 
safety, whether officers are rescuing someone from a burning 
building, protecting the community from the risks associated with 
the escape of a dangerous criminal, or ensuring that prosecutors 
have the evidence they need to secure convictions.115 As a result, 
the purported differences among the various categories of exigen-
cy easily break down.116 Police who make a warrantless entry to res-
cue a kidnapped child or to stop an assault or burglary in progress 
are obviously protecting the safety of the victims, but they are also 
investigating a crime.117 And it is not obvious why a more lenient
standard of exigency should apply in a case like Brigham City, where 
law enforcement officials were trying to help four adults restrain an 
out-of-control minor,118 than where police officers make a warrant-
less entry to prevent a serial killer from destroying evidence of a 
homicide.119
Language in Maryland v. Buie contrasting searches to uncover ev-
idence with searches to protect police officers does not call for a 
different conclusion.120 The Court’s opinion in that case did point 
out in a footnote that a protective sweep, like a Terry stop-and-frisk, 
then noting, “[o]ne exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist 
persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury”); Schmerber v. California 
384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (using the term “emergency” in discussing the destruction of evi-
dence); see also Meeks, 262 S.W.3d at 723 n.16 (observing that Brigham City “embedded the 
emergency aid exception deep within the exigent circumstances exception”); Deborah 
Tuerkheimer, Exigency, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 801, 812–13 (2007) (pointing out that Brigham City
“goes a considerable way toward collapsing any distinction” between emergency aid and exi-
gent circumstances searches, “at least in the significant subset of cases where exigency de-
rives from the risk of physical harm to a person”). But see Marinos, supra note 31, at 282–83 
(rejecting this view of Brigham City).
115. See, e.g., Dimino, supra note 102, at 1493; cf. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 
67, 84 (2001) (emphasizing the need to analyze the “immediate” rather than the “ulti-
mate . . . purpose” of an administrative search because “law enforcement involvement always 
serves some broader social purpose or objective”).
116. See, e.g., 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 3, § 11.01, at 181. Compare Decker, su-
pra note 101, at 511 (treating entries both to apprehend a fleeing suspect and to prevent the 
destruction of evidence as “crime solving” searches), with Stamm, supra note 31, at 1431 
(categorizing the prevention of flight as an emergency aid search).
117. See Decker, supra note 101, at 470–73, 479–90, 490–94 (listing these as examples of 
permissible emergency aid searches).
118. See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 401.
119. Cf. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 
41, at 12 (criticizing the approach of “artificially dichotomizing emergencies” as “rarely fruit-
ful (but invariably litigation-generating)”); Tuerkheimer, supra note 114, at 813 n.64 (“ques-
tion[ing] . . . whether judicial application of an ‘exigent circumstances’ versus an ‘emergen-
cy aid’ framework has practical consequences,” noting that “the imposition of an ‘exigent 
circumstances’ exception versus an ‘emergency exception’ rubric has not generally dictated 
outcomes” in courts’ decisions).
120. But cf. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 40, at 18 n.2 (citing Buie in arguing that 
“[t]he reasonable suspicion standard for emergency aid intrusions is consistent with the 
standard applied by this Court to other exigent circumstances that are justified by the need 
to protect the safety of officers or others”).
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is distinguishable from a “search[] for evidence plain and simple” 
and is justifiable on a showing of only reasonable suspicion because 
it is “limited to what is necessary to protect the safety of officers 
and others.”121 But the Court’s focus was on the invasiveness, rather 
than the purpose, of the intrusion, and the Court then went on to 
differentiate a protective sweep from a search incident to arrest—
which is designed to protect both the officer and the evidence (as
well as to prevent flight)122—because of “the more limited intrusion 
contemplated by a protective sweep.”123 Buie therefore does not 
support requiring less than probable cause of exigency when, in-
stead of a cursory sweep, the police engage in a “‘top-to-bottom’ 
search” under the exigent circumstances exception, even in the in-
terest of promoting safety concerns.124
Rather, as Buie suggests, the quantum of suspicion necessary for 
a warrantless exigent circumstances search or seizure should hinge 
on the nature of the intrusion and not the type of exigency in-
volved. Probable cause to believe exigent circumstances exist 
should be required before police use deadly force to apprehend a 
suspect or conduct a full search, whether the search is intended to 
prevent the destruction of evidence or to provide emergency aid. 
Reasonable suspicion of exigency should justify only less invasive 
exigent circumstances intrusions—protective sweeps, no-knock en-
tries, and impoundments. 
It remains to consider whether the constitutionality of the dif-
ferent varieties of exigent circumstances searches should turn on 
the police officer’s reasons for entering. That issue is the subject of 
the next section.
C. Subjective Motivation for Entering
Although the first two elements of the approach endorsed in this 
Article do not deviate from Supreme Court precedent, that is not 
true of the third and final element. In arguing that entries pur-
portedly justified by the need to provide emergency aid or serve 
some other non-law-enforcement concern should be permissible 
only if the officers’ primary reason for entering was actually to offer 
assistance, this Article maintains that the Court’s decision to the 
contrary in Brigham City v. Stuart was incorrect.125
121. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 335 n.3 (1990).
122. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969).
123. Buie, 494 U.S. at 336.
124. Id.
125. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404–05 (2006).
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What Brigham City failed to recognize is that this subset of exi-
gent circumstances searches are essentially administrative, or “spe-
cial needs,” searches. Just as administrative inspections are regula-
tory searches that have a “primary purpose” distinct from “the 
general interest in crime control”126—i.e., that serve “special needs, 
beyond the normal need for law enforcement”127—non-law-
enforcement exigent circumstances searches aim to protect some-
one’s person or property rather than uncover evidence of a crime. 
As a result, consistency with the Court’s administrative inspection 
precedents calls for an evaluation of the officers’ subjective motives 
to ensure that these emergency aid/community caretaking search-
es are not pretextual investigatory searches.128 Requiring a proper 
126. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000).
127. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the 
judgment), quoted in Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002). For criticism of the 
Court’s distinction between special needs and criminal law enforcement, see, for example, 
Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 977, 
1025 (calling the line “illusory” and “unwise”); David H. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory for 
Arrestee DNA and Other Biometric Databases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1095, 1126 (2013) (finding it 
“a little odd to consider motive . . . when non-law enforcement interests alone are pursued, 
but not when both law enforcement and non-law enforcement interests reinforce each oth-
er”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding Public, 1989 
SUP. CT. REV. 87, 89 (referring to the distinction as “chimerical and irrelevant”). But cf. Scott 
E. Sundby, Protecting the Citizen “Whilst He Is Quiet”: Suspicionless Searches, “Special Needs” and 
General Warrants, 74 MISS. L.J. 501, 551 (2004) (linking the Court’s decision to take on a “ju-
dicial oversight” “role as an active ‘policy magistrate’” in these cases to “the concerns over 
general warrants that gave rise to the Fourth Amendment”).
128. For others endorsing a subjective requirement in at least some exigent circum-
stances cases, see Bell, supra note 101, ¶ 33 (proposing that courts analyzing community 
caretaking searches “apply a reasonableness standard, coupled with [a] good faith require-
ment”); Bradley, Reasonable Policeman, supra note 34, at 371–72 (agreeing with Brigham City
that motivation is irrelevant when “police are acting for the protection of themselves or oth-
ers,” but arguing that “an actual belief” of exigency is necessary in hot pursuit and destruc-
tion of evidence cases); Decker, supra note 101, at 532 (advocating that officers performing 
community caretaking and emergency aid searches must be acting, “at least in part, on a 
subjective motivation to aid or protect life or property” and must also “reasonably believe”
their assistance is “needed immediately”); Dimino, supra note 102, at 1529 (recommending 
that community caretaking searches include both a subjective and an objective component, 
i.e., that the officer “subjectively held a belief that was objectively reasonable”); Edward G. 
Mascolo, The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Requirement Under the Fourth Amend-
ment, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 419, 426 (1973) (maintaining that police conducting emergency assis-
tance searches must “not enter with an accompanying intent to either arrest or search” and 
must also have “reasonable grounds to believe that there is an urgent need for such assis-
tance”); Fox, supra note 111, at 435 (suggesting that an officer’s “subjective motivations” be 
considered in evaluating community caretaking searches of a home but that “the plain view 
doctrine . . . be suspended” in such cases); Mark Goreczny, Note, Taking Care While Doing 
Right by the Fourth Amendment: A Pragmatic Approach to the Community Caretaker Exception, 14 
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 229, 250, 257–58 (2015) (proposing that community 
caretaking searches require “reasonable grounds to believe” in the need for assistance, as 
well as proof that the police were not “primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evi-
dence,” and that only “evidence found in plain view, related to the community caretaking 
reason for entry” of a home, be admissible); Naumann, supra note 112, at 364 (advocating 
that courts evaluate both “objective and subjective reasonableness” in community caretaking 
cases); Mannheimer, supra note 101 (endorsing a standard of reasonable suspicion plus mo-
SPRING 2019] The Quantum of Suspicion 639
purpose is especially critical if courts reject the twin probable cause 
requirements proposed in this Article and impose a lower standard 
of proof for those exigent circumstances searches that serve non-
law-enforcement interests.129
The Court’s opinion in Brigham City did not focus on the quan-
tum of evidence needed to trigger the exigent circumstances ex-
ception to the warrant requirement, but instead on the relevance 
of a police officer’s underlying purpose when conducting an 
emergency aid search. Relying on Fourth Amendment precedent 
that refused to consider law enforcement officials’ “subjective mo-
tivation,”130 the Court concluded that “[i]t . . . does not mat-
ter . . . whether the officers entered the kitchen to arrest respond-
ents and gather evidence against them or to assist the injured and 
prevent further violence.”131
The Court acknowledged, however, that its previous opinions in 
the area of administrative inspections have analyzed “programmatic
tive to assist for community caretaking searches). But cf. Marinos, supra note 31, at 287 (rec-
ommending that a non-emergency community caretaking search of a home require “an ob-
jective determination that a criminal investigation will not be part of the particular search”
rather than consideration of the searching officers’ actual subjective motivation). For a low-
er court opinion requiring proof of purpose in emergency aid cases despite the Court’s
holding in Brigham City, see People v. Slaughter, 803 N.W.2d 171, 179–82, 179 n.28 (Mich. 
2011) (relying on Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), discussed infra text accompanying 
notes 143–45, and Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), discussed infra text accompany-
ing notes 157–61). See generally George E. Dix, Subjective “Intent” as a Component of Fourth 
Amendment Reasonableness, 76 MISS. L.J. 373, 477, 479 (2006) (arguing broadly that Fourth 
Amendment intrusions should be deemed reasonable only if the “general legal theories”
used to justify the police conduct “were actually and subjectively within the analysis engaged 
in by the officers in deciding to take that action,” unless the prosecution can show some al-
ternative justification that the officers “would have considered . . . and acted in reliance on”
had they “not proceeded on the legal conclusion they actually relied upon”).
129. For courts taking this position, see supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text.
130. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404. For discussion of the Supreme Court’s inconsistent 
use of subjective versus objective police officer standards in its Fourth Amendment deci-
sions, see Kit Kinports, Criminal Procedure in Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 71, 78–
88 (2007).
131. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 405; see also Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (per 
curiam) (relying on Brigham City in holding that the constitutionality of an emergency aid 
search does not depend on whether the officer “subjectively believe[d]” that someone in the 
house was “seriously injured”); cf. Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 302 (2014) (citing 
Brigham City to support the proposition that the permissibility of removing a cotenant who 
objects to a consent search in, for example, cases of suspected domestic violence does not 
turn on “the subjective intent” of the officers but rather on whether “the removal of the po-
tential objector is objectively reasonable”); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 464 (2011) (cit-
ing Brigham City and Fisher in rejecting the view that the exigent circumstances exception is 
unavailable if the police “deliberately created the exigent circumstances with the bad faith 
intent to avoid the warrant requirement” (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 649, 
656 (Ky. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), rev’d, 563 U.S. 452 (2011))). But cf. Se-
gura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 812 (1984) (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by 
O’Connor, J.) (noting, in approving the duration of a nineteen-hour impoundment of an 
apartment, that there was “no suggestion that the officers, in bad faith, purposely delayed 
obtaining the warrant”).
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purpose.”132 The Supreme Court has generally upheld the constitu-
tionality of administrative search schemes only if, in addition to in-
cluding some mechanism to limit the discretion of the individual 
inspectors,133 the searches are “designed to serve ‘special needs, be-
yond the normal need for law enforcement,’” rather than pre-
textual searches for evidence.134 Thus, Brigham City cited, for exam-
ple, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, which struck down a drug 
checkpoint because—unlike a sobriety checkpoint based on 
“highway safety concern[s]”135—“the primary purpose” of the nar-
cotics checkpoint was “to detect evidence of ordinary criminal 
wrongdoing.”136 Likewise, the Court invalidated a public hospital’s 
132. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 405 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 
46 (2000)).
133. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658, 659 n.18, 661 (1979) (though recog-
nizing that the state’s “vital interest” in highway safety was “distinguishable from the general 
interest in crime control,” the Court went on to require some method of constraining “the 
unbridled discretion of law enforcement officials”). But cf. Eve Brensike Primus, Disentan-
gling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 279 (2011) (“document[ing] the dilu-
tion of protections against arbitrariness within administrative search doctrine”).
The Court’s opinions have fluctuated between treating discretion minimization as a 
separate hurdle that an administrative inspection must clear and considering it as one of the 
factors used in determining whether the inspection survives a balancing test that “weigh[s] 
the intrusion on the individual’s interest in privacy against the ‘special needs’ that sup-
port[]” the search. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001). For cases taking 
the former approach, see, for example, City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 
(2015) (observing that, “in order for an administrative search to be constitutional, the sub-
ject of the search must be afforded an opportunity to obtain precompliance review before a 
neutral decisionmaker” to protect against pretextual searches); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 
691, 703 (1987) (holding that the constitutionality of an administrative inspection turns on 
“‘a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant’” that “limit[s] the discretion of the 
inspecting officers” (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602–03 (1980))); Colorado v. 
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 n.6, 376 n.7 (1987) (pointing out that “[o]ur decisions have al-
ways adhered to the requirement that inventories be conducted according to standardized 
criteria” to “circumscribe the discretion of individual officers”); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661 (not-
ing, in requiring reasonable suspicion for a highway safety traffic stop, that the Court “in 
previous [administrative inspection] cases has insisted that the discretion of the official in 
the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent”); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 
532–33, 536–37 (1967) (separately analyzing discretion minimization and the balancing 
test). For decisions discussing discretion as one of the relevant factors in applying the bal-
ancing test, see, for example, Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449–53 (1990) 
(reasoning that the lack of discretion given to the officials on the scene minimized the intru-
siveness of a DUI checkpoint), and Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 
665–67 (1989) (rejecting the need for a warrant because no discretion was exercised in de-
termining which employees to drug test).
134. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 
(1995) (internal quotation marks omitted in original)). But cf. Brensike Primus, supra note 
133, at 257 (charging that “the rules governing administrative searches are notoriously un-
clear”); Clancy, supra note 127, at 1022 n.298 (calling the Court’s special needs doctrine 
“formless,” “more a facade for policy results than an analytical framework supporting rea-
soned decisionmaking”).
135. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 447 (upholding a DUI checkpoint).
136. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41, 43. The Court left open whether the Indianapolis check-
point would have been permissible if its “primary purpose” had been “checking licenses or 
driver sobriety” with “a secondary purpose of interdicting narcotics.” Id. at 47 n.2.
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program of drug testing pregnant women because “the immediate 
objective of the searches was to generate evidence for law enforce-
ment purposes,” and therefore the program “simply [did] not fit 
within the closely guarded category of ‘special needs.’”137
Despite Brigham City’s emphasis on Edmond’s use of the word 
“programmatic,” other Supreme Court opinions evaluating the 
constitutionality of administrative searches have in fact been con-
cerned with the motives of the individual who actually conducted 
the inspection.138 The Court’s first administrative search decision, 
Camara v. Municipal Court, for example, directed that city officials 
obtain administrative area warrants for housing inspections lest res-
idents be “subject to the discretion of the official in the field.”139
Similarly, in Delaware v. Prouse, the Court required reasonable sus-
picion to support a highway safety automobile stop involving a li-
cense and registration check so as to prevent police officers from 
exercising “standardless and unconstrained discretion.”140 And in 
upholding the administrative search of an automobile junkyard in 
New York v. Burger, the Court ruled that the statute authorizing the 
inspection “must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers” in 
order to pass constitutional scrutiny.141 In addition, the Burger
Court made clear that it found “no reason to believe that the instant 
inspection was actually a ‘pretext’ for obtaining evidence” of a 
crime.142
137. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83–84 (emphasis omitted). But cf. Kaye, supra note 127, at 1125 
(arguing that both Edmond and Ferguson were “single-motive cases involving single-purpose 
programs” and therefore the Court’s “‘primary purpose’ language is dicta”).
138. See generally Brensike Primus, supra note 133, at 260–61. Brensike Primus describes, 
and criticizes, the Court’s “entanglement” of two different types of inspections into “a single 
category” of searches that are “both labeled ‘administrative’”: “dragnet intrusions,” such as 
checkpoints and housing inspections, which permit “searches or seizures of every person, 
place, or thing in a specific location or involved in a specific activity”; and “special subpopu-
lation searches,” which allow searches of “certain people (or people acting in certain capaci-
ties)” based on “individualized suspicion” that does not “rise to the level of probable cause.”
Id.
139. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967). For further discussion of the 
showing required to obtain these warrants, see infra notes 165–66 and accompanying text.
140. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979).
141. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703 (1987) (articulating the requirements neces-
sary for a statute to “provid[e] a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant” (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981))).
142. Id. at 716 n.27 (emphasis added); see also City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 
2443, 2452–53 (2015) (requiring “an opportunity for precompliance review” before police 
may view a hotel registry so as to prevent the “intolerable risk” that these administrative 
searches can be “used as a pretext to harass hotel operators and their guests”); City of Ontar-
io v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 761 (2010) (concluding that the search of a municipal employee’s
text messages was based on a permissible “‘noninvestigatory work-related purpose”‘ given 
the specific reasons why the chief of police “ordered the search” (quoting O’Connor v. Or-
tega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (plurality opinion))); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
U.S. 873, 882 (1975) (holding that reasonable suspicion is needed to stop vehicles close to 
the border to check for undocumented immigrants in order to ensure that the people living 
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Perhaps most on point, the Court’s opinion in Michigan v. Tyler
specifically recognized the relevance of an individual inspector’s 
motive in “the context of investigatory fire searches,” which, the 
Court noted, are “not programmatic but are responsive to individual 
events.”143 The Court observed that administrative inspections to 
determine the cause of a fire were distinguishable from the “rou-
tine building inspections” at issue in Camara, which could be gov-
erned by “broad legislative or administrative guidelines specifying 
the purpose, frequency, scope, and manner of conducting the in-
spections.”144 Rather, the permissibility of fire inspections turned 
on the motivation of the person conducting the search. An admin-
istrative warrant suffices, the Court explained, when “the purpose 
of the investigation is to determine the cause and to prevent such 
fires from occurring or recurring,” but a traditional search warrant 
is required when “the authorities are seeking evidence to be used 
in a criminal prosecution.”145
Thus, while an evaluation of the overall programmatic purpose 
of an administrative inspection scheme might be appropriate in 
cases involving roadblocks or building inspections—where the pro-
tocol for choosing which vehicles to stop and which properties to 
search is determined in advance, usually by higher-level supervi-
sors146—that approach does not suffice in cases such as Tyler and 
Brigham City, where all relevant decisions are necessarily made in 
the heat of the moment by the actors conducting the search or sei-
zure.147 Warrantless entries to provide emergency aid, like entries 
in those communities are not subjected to “potentially unlimited interference with their use 
of the highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers”); Almeida-Sanchez v. Unit-
ed States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973) (requiring probable cause to search a car near the bor-
der in order to limit the “unfettered discretion” of Border Patrol agents); Sundby, supra note 
127, at 515 (noting that the Court’s “early ‘special need’ cases . . . tended to focus on guard-
ing against ‘standardless and unconstrained discretion’ being granted to the officer in the 
field rather than on scrutinizing the policy judgment of the need for the search in the first 
place” (quoting Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454 (1990) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted in original))).
143. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507 (1978) (emphasis added).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 508 (quoting People v. Tyler, 250 N.W.2d 467, 477 (Mich. 1977), aff’d, 436 
U.S. 499 (1978)).
146. See, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453 (observing that the location of the DUI checkpoints was 
“selected pursuant to guidelines” created by an Advisory Committee and the police 
“stop[ped] every approaching vehicle”); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321 n.17 
(1978) (referring to the safety inspection of a workplace as a search conducted pursuant to a 
“general schedule” (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 9 n.7, Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 
307 (1978) (No. 76-1143))); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976) (not-
ing that “[t]he location of a fixed [immigration] checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the 
field, but by officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective alloca-
tion of limited enforcement resources”); see also 5 LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 10.8(d), at 437–
40 (surveying lower court opinions addressing checkpoints).
147. Cf. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) (warning that “the pur-
pose inquiry in this context is to be conducted only at the programmatic level and is not an 
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to investigate the cause of a fire, should be upheld only when “the 
officer’s purpose is . . . to attend to the special needs . . . for which 
the administrative inspection is justified,”148 and not when the po-
lice engage in “searches that are not made for those purposes,”
such as searches for evidence.149 In non-law-enforcement exigent 
circumstances cases, therefore, an analysis of the individual of-
ficer’s subjective motivation is needed to ensure that the searches 
are in fact primarily intended to provide assistance and not to in-
vestigate a crime.
In addition to these administrative search precedents, the 
Court’s opinions assessing the constitutionality of inventory 
searches—administrative-like inspections150 designed to safeguard a 
car owner’s property, protect police departments from claims of 
lost property, and preserve officer and public safety151—have ex-
pressed concern that the individual officials performing the inven-
tories must not be engaging in pretextual searches for law en-
forcement purposes. In South Dakota v. Opperman, for example, the 
invitation to probe the minds of individual officers acting at the scene” of the narcotics 
checkpoint).
148. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 737 (2011).
149. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996).
150. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 7.4(a), at 848 (analogizing inventories to “other types 
of inspections or regulatory searches”); cf. 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 3, § 15.01[A], 
at 237 n.2 (noting that inventory searches “could reasonably fit” under the administrative 
search rubric, but developed as an “independent” warrant exception “[l]argely for [the] his-
torical reason[]” that the initial administrative inspection cases “focused on activities of non-
police officers” (emphasis omitted)); Brensike Primus, supra note 133, at 303 (agreeing that 
inventory searches are a “special type” of administrative search “[i]n substance,” but arguing 
that “the inventory search exception has long been carved off from the larger body of drag-
net administrative searches”).
Brensike Primus acknowledges that the Court’s inventory search opinions “sometimes 
[make] a passing reference to administrative search cases,” but she concludes that the Court 
“does not situate the inventory search exception in . . . its administrative search doctrine.” Id.
at 304. In support of this argument, she correctly points out that the Court has referred to 
the inventory search as “a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement,” Colorado v. 
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987), and that the Court’s initial inventory search opinion 
“drew from its cases recognizing . . . the automobile exception” instead of “rely[ing] on its 
administrative search precedent.” Brensike Primus, supra, at 303 n.254 (citing South Dakota 
v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373 (1976)). But Opperman specifically referred to inventory 
searches as an exercise of police officers’ “routine administrative caretaking functions.” Op-
perman, 428 U.S. at 370 n.5. Moreover, while the Court in Opperman did “distinguish[] auto-
mobile inspections from administrative search cases,” Brensike Primus, supra, at 304 n.256 
(citing Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367 n.2), the cited footnote merely refused to apply Camara’s
warrant requirement to automobile searches. In fact, the footnote implied that inventory 
searches are a species of administrative inspection, noting that Camara required a warrant to 
search a home “to ascertain health or safety conditions,” but that “this procedure has never been 
held applicable to automobile inspections for safety purposes.” Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367 n.2 
(emphasis added). Given the functional similarity between administrative inspections and 
inventory searches, it makes sense to include “noncriminal,” “noninvestigative” inventory 
searches under the administrative search umbrella. Id. at 370 n.5; see also infra notes 162–63 
and accompanying text (explaining the link between inventory and community caretaking 
searches).
151. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372; Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369, 376 n.10.
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majority observed that “this Court has consistently sustained police 
intrusions into automobiles impounded or otherwise in lawful po-
lice custody where the process is aimed at securing or protecting 
the car and its contents.”152 The Court upheld the inventory search 
at issue in Opperman, finding “no suggestion whatever” that the 
search conducted there was “a pretext concealing an investigatory 
police motive.”153 When the constitutionality of the inventory 
search of an impounded automobile next reached the Court in 
Colorado v. Bertine, the Court likewise commented that “reasonable 
police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in 
good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment” and that, on the facts be-
fore it, “[t]here was no showing that the police chose to impound 
Bertine’s van in order to investigate suspected criminal activity.”154
And in its most recent discussion of these searches, the Court in 
Florida v. Wells summarized its inventory search precedents as “for-
bidding uncanalized discretion to police officers.”155 Given the lan-
guage in this line of cases, some lower courts asked to evaluate the 
permissibility of an inventory search have properly engaged in an 
assessment of the motives of the individual officers who conducted 
the search.156
Not only did the Supreme Court in Brigham City deviate from its 
case law governing inventory and other administrative searches, 
but it also neglected to even mention the Court’s first community 
caretaking opinion, Cady v. Dombrowski, which similarly focused on 
the searching officer’s “specific motivation” for acting.157 The Court 
in Cady defined “community caretaking functions” as “totally di-
vorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence 
152. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 373; see also id. at 370 n.5 (referring to permissible inventory 
searches as “routine, non-criminal procedures” where “no claim is made that the protective 
procedures are a subterfuge for criminal investigations”); id. at 370 n.6 (characterizing in-
ventory searches as occurring in a “benign noncriminal context”).
153. Id. at 376.
154. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374, 376 (emphasis added); see also id. at 372 (“[T]here was no 
showing that the police, who were following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or 
for the sole purpose of investigation.”); id. at 375 (noting that “[n]othing . . . prohibits the 
exercise of police discretion so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard 
criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity”).
155. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990); see also id. (“Our view that standardized crite-
ria or established routine must regulate the opening of containers found during inventory 
searches is based on the principle that an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general 
rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.” (citations omitted)).
156. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 7.4(a), at 852–54 & nn.83–85 (citing cases); see also id.
at 851 (rejecting the proposition that “any inventory undertaken in compliance with a police 
department regulation is lawful”). But cf. Dix, supra note 128, at 439–40, 439 n.271 (reading 
Brigham City’s reference to “‘programmatic purpose’” and use of a “‘see also’” citation to 
Wells as “strongly hint[ing]” that subjective motivation is no longer relevant in inventory 
search cases (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 405 (2006))).
157. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 444 (1973).
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relating to the violation of a criminal statute.”158 In upholding the 
search of an arrested police officer’s vehicle after the car had been 
towed to a garage, the Court emphasized that the “purpose of [the 
search] was to look for respondent’s service revolver” and “the jus-
tification” was therefore “concern for the safety of the general pub-
lic.”159 Even if Brigham City’s failure to cite Cady can be attributed to 
the Court’s assumption that community caretaking searches are 
limited to automobiles or do not involve the same sense of urgency 
as emergency aid cases,160 there is still considerable overlap be-
tween the rationales underlying community caretaking and emer-
gency aid searches.161 Brigham City’s unexplained departure from 
Cady’s reliance on the searching officer’s motivation is therefore 
troubling. 
Moreover, subsequent Supreme Court opinions have viewed Ca-
dy v. Dombrowski as an impoundment case. In recognizing the con-
stitutionality of warrantless inventory searches in Opperman, for ex-
ample, the Court relied on Cady and described an inventory search 
as “a caretaking search of a lawfully impounded automobile.”162 The 
fact that the Court sees the administrative-like inventory search as 
falling within the community caretaking umbrella thus provides 
further support for likewise treating all non-law-enforcement exi-
gent circumstances searches as a type of administrative inspection 
and incorporating a subjective motivation requirement.163
Analogizing emergency aid searches to inventory searches does 
not undermine the probable cause standards endorsed above. Ad-
mittedly, the Court’s inventory search precedents have admon-
ished that “[t]he policies behind the warrant requirement are not 
implicated in an inventory search, nor is the related concept of 
probable cause.”164 But the Court has required a form of probable 
cause in other administrative search cases. Reasoning that the 
158. Id. at 441.
159. Id. at 437, 447; see also id. at 443 (noting that the search was “‘standard procedure in 
[that police] department,’ to protect the public from the possibility that a revolver would fall 
into untrained or perhaps malicious hands” (alteration in original) (quoting the lower 
courts)).
160. See supra note 111.
161. See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text.
162. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375 (1976) (emphasis added); see id. at 
370 n.5 (observing that an inventory search serves “routine administrative caretaking func-
tions”); see also Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (likewise citing Cady and refer-
ring to “police caretaking procedures designed to secure and protect vehicles and their con-
tents within police custody”).
163. Cf. Dimino, supra note 102, at 1522 (describing administrative searches as “exam-
ples of community caretaking,” though arguing that they differ because administrative in-
spectors “serve those non-law-enforcement purposes by enforcing the law”).
164. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371; see also Opperman, 428 U.S. at 370 n.5 (noting that “[t]he 
standard of probable cause is peculiarly related to criminal investigations, not routine, non-
criminal procedures”).
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Fourth Amendment’s “test of ‘probable cause’ . . . can take into ac-
count the nature of the search that is being sought,”165 the Court 
held in Camara v. Municipal Court that the probable cause necessary 
to support the administrative warrants needed for housing inspec-
tions “exist[s] if reasonable legislative or administrative standards 
for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a 
particular dwelling.”166 Likewise, in discussing the permissibility of 
administrative searches to determine the cause of a fire, the Court 
in Michigan v. Tyler relied on Camara and observed that “[t]he 
showing of probable cause . . . may vary with the object and intru-
siveness of the search.”167 Thus, requiring probable cause for non-
law-enforcement exigent circumstances searches is not inconsistent 
with viewing them as administrative inspections.
More fundamentally, a showing of probable cause is unnecessary 
in inventory search cases because the Court has relied on an alter-
native method of limiting the discretion of the officers who con-
duct those searches: they must have been “following standardized 
procedures.”168 Police departments cannot create standard operat-
ing procedures for cases involving exigent circumstances because 
the existence of an exigency by definition “must be determined 
case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.”169 The 
probable cause standards advocated in this Article thus substitute 
for regularized procedures in satisfying the Court’s requirement 
that administrative searches must include some mechanism to cab-
in the discretion of the individual inspectors.170
165. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (quoting Frank v. Maryland, 359 
U.S. 360, 383 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
166. Id. Although there is some scholarly support for requiring Camara-type administra-
tive warrants for at least certain community caretaking searches, see Marinos, supra note 31, 
at 283–89, others have pointed out that these cases “arise on the spur of the moment . . .
without [the] forewarning” necessary to enable police to obtain a warrant. Dimino, supra
note 102, at 1521. For other sources rejecting a warrant requirement in non-law-
enforcement exigent circumstances cases, see Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 
563–66 (7th Cir. 2014); Decker, supra note 101, at 532; Helding, supra note 111, at 155–58.
167. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978).
168. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372; see also Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (likewise requir-
ing that police follow standard practices in determining which containers to open during an 
inventory search).
169. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 145 (2013); see also Dimino, supra note 102, at 
1527 (pointing out that “protocols for dealing with community-caretaking situations . . .
would be a poor fit for many of the events police officers must encounter”).
170. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973) (requiring probable 
cause to conduct an administrative search of a vehicle near the border in order to limit the 
discretion exercised by law enforcement officials); cf. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 
341–42 (1985) (concluding that reasonable suspicion is needed to justify the administrative 
inspection of a student’s purse); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975) 
(holding that reasonable suspicion is necessary to stop vehicles close to the border in order 
to constrain inspectors’ discretion); Brensike Primus, supra note 133, at 272 (noting that, in 
some of its administrative search opinions, the Court has “relied on a post hoc analysis of . . .
the government’s showing of individualized suspicion” in order to “cabin executive discre-
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When law enforcement officials make a warrantless exigent cir-
cumstances entry to protect someone’s person or property, they 
are, in essence, conducting an administrative search. Drawing from 
the Supreme Court precedent assessing the constitutionality of 
other administrative inspections, courts should permit this subset 
of exigent circumstances searches only if there is some discretion-
limiting mechanism in place (here, probable cause) and if the po-
lice acted for the proper reasons. These exigent circumstances 
searches should therefore survive constitutional scrutiny only if the 
officer’s primary motive for entering was to provide assistance or 
serve some other non-law-enforcement interest. 
Although ascertaining an actor’s motive can be difficult,171 the 
Court pointed out in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond that “courts rou-
tinely engage in this enterprise in many areas of constitutional ju-
risprudence as a means of sifting abusive governmental conduct 
from that which is lawful.”172 In addition, the Court’s administrative 
inspection rulings have instructed judges to “consider all the avail-
able evidence in order to determine the relevant primary pur-
pose.”173 Thus, courts can analyze, for example, whether the actions 
taken and the questions asked by officers who purportedly made 
an emergency aid entry were consistent with the primary goal of 
providing assistance or, instead, suggested a motive to uncover evi-
dence of a crime.174
tion”). But cf. Dimino, supra note 102, at 1528 (viewing a subjective motivation requirement 
as a sufficient “discretion-limiting” mechanism); Fox, supra note 111, at 425 (same).
171. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 46 (2000) (acknowledging “the 
challenges inherent in a purpose inquiry”); see also supra notes 115–19 and accompanying 
text.
172. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46–47; see also Dix, supra note 128, at 472 (finding “no obvious 
reason why expeditions into the minds of police officers should be any more difficult or ex-
pensive” than mens rea “inquir[ies] into the minds of those accused of crime”). But cf. Kaye, 
supra note 127, at 1126, 1120 (describing “[m]ixed-motive or primary-purpose analysis” as 
“notoriously slippery” and “a major headache in many areas of the law,” and therefore argu-
ing that “multipurpose search regimes should be eligible for special-needs balancing”).
173. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001); see also Edmond, 531 U.S. at 
46 (observing that “we examine the available evidence to determine the primary purpose of 
the checkpoint program”); Dix, supra note 128, at 473 (noting that “circumstantial evi-
dence—specifically . . . the officer’s conduct . . .—could permit an inference” as to the of-
ficer’s subjective state of mind).
174. See Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (per curiam) (summarizing the de-
fendant’s argument that the officers there “could not have been motivated by a perceived 
need to provide medical assistance, since they never summoned emergency medical person-
nel”); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 402 (2006) (describing the state supreme court’s
observation that the police “had not sought to assist the injured adult, but instead had acted 
‘exclusively in their law enforcement capacity’” (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 122 P.3d 
506, 513 (Utah 2005), rev’d, 547 U.S. 398 (2006))); cf. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507 
(1978) (suggesting “relevant factors” to evaluate the permissibility of an administrative entry 
to investigate a fire scene, including “[t]he number of prior entries, the scope of the search, 
the time of day when it is proposed to be made, [and] the lapse of time since the fire”).
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CONCLUSION
For decades, the Supreme Court has failed to clarify what show-
ing of exigency is needed to trigger the exigent circumstances ex-
ception to the warrant requirement. At times requiring probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion, the Court on other occasions has 
used vague and undefined terms like “reason to believe” without 
situating that standard on the probable cause/reasonable suspicion 
continuum. Not surprisingly, the conflicting signals coming from 
the Justices have led to disagreements among the lower courts.
In resolving that conflict, this Article has argued that two distinct 
findings of probable cause should be required to support a war-
rantless exigent circumstances search. First, there is no justifica-
tion, and no support in the Court’s precedents, for departing from 
the traditional mandate that police need probable cause to enter 
for any exigent circumstances search. Second, probable cause of
exigency—probable cause to believe that some untoward conse-
quence would arise if the officers took the time to obtain a war-
rant—should also be necessary for any full search. Reasonable sus-
picion of exigency should suffice only for less invasive intrusions,
such as protective sweeps, no-knock entries, and impoundments of 
the premises while police seek a warrant. 
Finally, when the police want to rely on non-law-enforcement in-
terests to make a warrantless exigent circumstances entry—the so-
called emergency aid and community caretaking searches—they 
are essentially conducting an administrative inspection. Consisten-
cy with the Court’s Fourth Amendment rulings in that area there-
fore requires a third justification. Ensuring that these intrusions 
truly are intended to further their administrative purpose of 
providing assistance, and are not pretextual searches for evidence, 
calls for overruling the Court’s decision in Brigham City v. Stuart
that an individual officer’s subjective motivations are irrelevant. 
When evaluating this subset of exigent circumstances searches, 
then, courts should also analyze whether the officer’s primary rea-
son for entering was to offer assistance or instead to investigate a 
crime.
